Indonesa: The Rise of Capital: A Review Essay by Winters, Jeffrey A.
INDONESIA THE RISE OF CAPITAL: A REVIEW ESSAY*
Jeffrey A. Winters
Introduction* 1
A few months ago I was approached by a professor of Southeast Asian political
economy who planned to use Richard Robison’s The Rise o f Capital in an under­
graduate course she was preparing. Rather pressed for time, and being a specialist
on countries in Southeast Asia other than Indonesia, she asked me if I would suggest
one or two pieces in the literature which might stand as a stimulating counter­
poise to Robison’s book. I answered that Robison’s own earlier work, including hb
dissertation2 and articles publbhed in thb journal,3 b  probably the best material
currently available to confront the arguments presented in The Rise o f Capital.
We speculated on the probable reactions of students to the spectacle of a scholar
debating her or himself. Would they conclude that the world b  so lacking in students
of Indonesian political economy that a major scholar has no choice but to write 
hb or her own "Anti—Diihring*?4
The Rise o f Capital b , first of all, a very important (and desperately needed) 
contribution to the literature on Indonesian politics. In the questions it rabes and
the exciting areas for research it pioneers, Robbon’s book represents by far the
best work currently being done on post—1965 Indonesian politics. Unlike hb disserta­
tion, which has been influential but which painted too static a picture of the Indone­
sian polity, thb latest effort by Robison b  stimulating, dynamic, and controversial.
The tone b  set (and the opening volley shot) with the book’s very first sentence: 
"The most important revolutionary force at work in the Third World today b  not
communbm or socialbm but capitalbm" (p. vii).5 Thb declaration carries Robison
*  Indonesia: The Rise o f Capital, by Richard Robison. Asian Studies Association of 
Australia, Southeast Asia Publications Series, No. 13. Sydney: Allen Si Unwin, 1986.
1. Thb article b  based upon work supported under a National Science Foundation
Graduate Fellowship. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations ex­
pressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the National Science Foundation.
2. Richard Robbon, "Capitalbm and the Bureaucratic State in Indonesia: 1965—1975" 
(Ph.D dissertation, Sydney University, 1977).
3. See Richard Robbon, "Towards a Class Analyse of the Indonesian Military Bureau­
cratic State," Indonesia 25 (1978): 17—39, and "Culture, Politics, and Economy in 
the Political Hbtoiy of the New Order," Indonesia 31 (1981): 1—29.
4. Though Robison b  probably hb own most formidable critic, he b  not debating 
only himself. In hb theoretical chapter he makes hb differences with every other 
major Western Indonesianbt quite plain.
5. Throughout the text of thb essay and in the footnotes, unless otherwbe identified, 
page numbers in parentheses refer to The Rise o f Capital.
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through eleven chapters and almost four—hundred pages densely packed with information 
and argumentation. So stimulating did I find the book that it generated stacks of 
notecards which I hoped to  weave into this assessment of his success. Though I
take issue with many of the arguments Robison advances (even his primary one), 
I should admit that almost all the ideas I use to  criticize his positions were generated
while reading his book.
Before turning to the body of this essay, one final point of recognition should 
be made. Robison has done a great service to  students of Indonesian politics, for 
he has, with The Rise o f Capital, put Indonesia on the comparative politics map.
Scholars and teachers casting about for an excellent case study to  use for comparative 
purposes* with other, similar Third World countries (Nigeria and Mexico come imme­
diately to mind) can now finally look at and comment upon Indonesia.6 W e shall 
all benefit tremendously from this very well—researched and well—presented analysis
of post-W orld W ar II Indonesian political economy.
Robison's Argument: A  B rie f Overview
There are three key elements in the design of Robison’s book. The first is his 
argument that a significant or substantial indigenous bourgeoisie had finally been 
formed in Indonesia by the late 1970s. The second and related element is his descrip­
tion of how (by what processes and through what mechanisms) this indigenous class 
developed. Making a convincing case for these first two components of his argument 
constitutes what Robison terms his "first task": to trace and document the actual 
"rise" of indigenous capital in Indonesia. There is, in addition, a third element (consti­
tuting a second task) to  Robison’s argument which deals with the impact of the 
rise of an indigenous bourgeoisie on the Indonesian state.7
As a useful first step I will review briefly this tw o-task argument contained 
in The Rise o f Capital. This will be followed by a general critique of the book, 
and, finally, I will discuss what I believe to be the primaiy flaw in Robison’s work: 
his overly narrow focus on the rise and impact of the indigenous bourgeoisie to
6. The book will have served no small purpose if it doubles to  200 the number of
persons in the United States who can name every Indonesian president, one major
Indonesian city (not counting the Capital and "Bali"), and recognize that the "New
Order" is not some sort of avant-garde organization for reformist nuns.
7. Save for about twenty pages in the final chapter, the entire book, spanning a
century and a half of history, is written from the perspective of the capitalist
class in Indonesia (even when, by Robison’s own admission, this group is so small 
and weak that it hardly exists). A  second and rather frustrating point should be 
raised here. Though Robison is concerned with questions of the "state," "state policy,"
"state structure," and "state function," he does not take up the task of explaining 
systematically what, exactly, he means by these terms and concepts, the relationships
among them, and the impact of social classes upon them (and vice versa). On the
one hand, this omission is understandable, as whole bodies of literature, especially 
in the Maixist tradition, are devoted to  the analysis of these daunting subjects.
On the other hand, it is not nearly enough to  cite, as Robison does, the Poulantzas—
Miliband debate and move on. Had Robison put forth a clear and consistent statement
on these matters, it would have been possible both to assess his position and offer 
amendments to  it. Regrettably, space limitations allow me neither to describe what
I think Robison means when he writes about things like the state, nor to suggest
alternative definitions.
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the near exclusion of important competing and even prior factors (mainly structural 
and extra—national) in the political economy of post—1965 Indonesia.
The ”F irst Task"
In an article describing the purpose and content of his book, Robison writes,
■In The Rise o f Capital my first task was to  challenge the myth that there was 
no national capitalist class."8 By the sixth chapter of his book he proclaims the 
task accomplished.9 The indigenous capitalist class, which arose not from petty 
bourgeois beginnings but from within the state, had by the late 1970s been bom.
Robison is very specific about the factors that contributed directly to the "rise" 
of capital. First, there were the institutional instruments. These included joint ventures
with foreign and Chinese capitalists, and the various military and politico-bureaucratic 
business groups which flourished after 1965. These entrepreneurial clusters supplied 
a structure within which an indigenous class could be "nurtured." The most important 
institutional instrument of all, for Robison, was the array of state corporations
through and around which an indigenous bourgeoisie could be built up. He writes,
State capital in the New Order Indonesia fs/c] has not been an instru­
ment for confrontation or expropriation of bourgeois capitalism but
the central component of a state-led , corporatist form of capitalism, 
constituting a framework within which domestic private capital accumula­
tion is nurtured, (p. 220)10
The state enterprises were particularly important for "asli" (meaning indigenous)
entrepreneurs in that they supplied key opportunities for "spin-offs? in such areas
as consumer manufacturing.
These institutional mechanisms or instruments were supported and helped along, 
in Robison’s story, tty a long-standing and deliberate effort on the part of the
state to create a strong indigenous capitalist class.11 This objective was part of a
8. Richard Robison, "The Rise of Capital," Inside Indonesia 9 (December 1986): 2. 
Robison does not mention his own contributions to the life of this "myth." See 
below, n. 31.
9. "By the end of the 1970s the picture of domestic capital as weak, dependent 
and subservient could no longer be sustained" (p. 176).
10. For reasons which are not immediately evident, Robison vacillates (between pages 
212 and 220) on the admittedly "contentious" issue of whether the state corpora­
tions were mainly instruments for the patrimonial appropriation of surplus, or for 
the provision of conditions for the accumulation of private capital, and hence, to  
create a capitalist class. As is clear from this passage, however, Robison decides 
finally that they are instruments for the creation of capitalists.
11. "The emergence of these (domestic corporate] groups was directly related to  state 
intervention on their behalf. Policies of protection and subsidy were complemented 
by privileged access to trade monopolies, forestry concessions, state bank credit 
and government contracts for construction and supply. Most important, the state 
poured billions of dollars into investment in infrastructure and large industrial projects 
(directed through the instruments described above, mainly] which acted as a catalyst 
to capital accumulation in the private sector." (Robison, Inside Indonesia, p. 2). In 
The Rise o f Capital, Robison argues that state banks were "used in a deliberate 
fashion" as "instruments of government policy to  build a strong domestic capitalist 
class . . ." (p. 224).
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larger strategy of "nationalist" industrialization which, according to Robison, dated 
back to the earliest days of Indonesian independence. There were a variety of impedi­
ments to the actual implementation of the nationalist strategy— not least of which 
being the pressures mainly from abroad for Indonesia to integrate itself into the 
New International Division of Labor (NIDL). The critical turning point in the struggle
(between "national* and international forces of capital) to gain meaningful legislative 
support for the cause of the indigenous bourgeoisie, Robison argues, was the "Malari*12 
of 1974. These riots so unsettled General Suharto’s New Order regime that immediate 
changes in Indonesian state policy were implemented to give more advantages to 
indigenous capitalists in their long and losing struggle with their Chinese and foreign
competitdrs.13 The elements of the asli bourgeoisie that benefitted most from these 
changes, Robison points out, did not themselves take part in the uprisings.
These, then, are the main highlights of the actual rise of the Indonesian capitalist 
class. Robison does not stop, of course, at merely describing the rise itself. He 
goes on to  consider the socio-political impact of this nascent indigenous class on 
the structure and operation of the Indonesian state. Attention turns now to his
discussion of the significance of the rise of capital in Indonesia.
The Second Task
The strong indigenous bourgeoisie in Indonesia is comprised predominantly of 
erstwhile politico-bureaucrats located within (or, at the very least, attached directly 
to) the state. These new capitalists amassed most of their operating capital by exploit­
ing the privileges they gained (monopolies, contracts, permits, credit, etc.) from
their access to the essentially "patrimonial"14 state. But unlike their counterparts
of the earlier "Benteng"15 program and Guided Economy period,16 these new capitalists 
were no longer mere "briefcase" entrepreneurs who immediately sold their privileged 
access to licenses and contracts to "real" Chinese and foreign capitalists.17 The 
emergent strong asli bourgeoisie of the New Order period themselves became capitalists 
with a direct stake in capitalism. The main reason for this transformation was that 
the new-style capitalists actually became shareholders (albeit usually minor partners)
12. "Malari" stands for Malapetaka Januari and refers to  the uprisings of Januaiy
15, 1974 in Jakarta.
13. See, for instance, these claims on pp. 166 and 326.
14. It should be noted that, in sharp contrast to his usage in his dissertation, Robison 
eschews this language in The Rise o f Capital. Nevertheless, it remains evident that 
it was basically through patronage practices that the upper—most stratum of the 
indigenous bourgeoisie arose.
15. "Benteng" refers to the Indonesian government program between 1950 and 1956 
in which import licenses were reserved for use by indigenous importers. Almost all
the licenses were sold to Chinese entrepreneurs.
16. Guided Economy is the name for the period from 1959 to 1965 during which
state direction and ownership of the economy were emphasized.
17. These were sometimes called "ali—baba" arrangements, where "ali" referred to 
the "politically connected" indigenous fixer and "baba" referred to  the Chinese or 
foreign entrepreneur who would own and operate a company or use a license or
permit.
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in the Joint ventures with Chinese and foreigners— particularly after the events of 
1974.18
In Robison’s view, this gradual capitalist—ization of the former politico—bureaucrats 
created in each individual a "tension11 as their priorities and motivations were now
simultaneously shaped by irreconcilable patrimonial and entrepreneurial logics.19 
Though still partly' dependent on the continued privileges the "bureaucratic capitalist"
state confers, members of the strong indigenous bourgeoisie in Indonesia are increas­
ingly forced to choose between their interests in a "regularized" (or in Weberian
terms, "legal—rational") system for their activities as industrial capitalists on the
one hand, and the perpetuation of the veiy tribute system which has served them  
so well in the past on the other. In Robison’s estimation, there is a fairly clear 
tendency in the direction of pressures for regularization as expressed through such
state—created and -dom inated institutions as Kadin20 and Golkar.21
Thus the rise of a strong asli bourgeoisie in Indonesia is having an impact
not only at a personal level, but at the level of the state structure and operation
itself. "Will the dual role of politico—bureaucrats as capitalists," Robison asks, "bring 
the existing contradictions in the relationships between state and capital to a crisis
point?" (p. 342-43). He never answers this question conclusively, but he does say 
that the nascent strong Indonesian capitalist class constitutes "a new and significant 
focus of socio-economic powei" (p. 177) which "has been successful in forcing the 
beginnings of a restructuring of state power. . . .*22
18. Robison says, for instance, that generals who accumulated wealth on the basis 
of politico—bureaucratic practices had, by the late 1970s, an avenue to  "entry into
the capitalist class on their own behalf" (p. 268). As capitalists, military officers 
"develop an interest* in the establishment of policies conducive to  the general pro­
cesses of accumulation, such as "the control of labour" (p. 267). One could probably
argue persuasively, of course, that even before becoming capitalists military officers
displayed interests along these lines, though perhaps the specific motives for doing 
so were different.
19. This tension, in Robison’s view, is manifested even at the palace level. Because
the Suharto family has accumulated a "substantial base of capital ownership," their
position is no longer exclusively based on political muscle and patrimonial networks.
"The Suhartos are now," writes Robison, "both politico-bureaucrats and capitalists" 
(p. 349). It is not at all clear to me why there should be any "tension” in this
arrangement for the Suhartos.
20. Kadin stands for Kamar Dagang dan Industri, or Chamber of Trade and Industiy.
21. Writes Robison, "Once domestic business groups were established the benefits
of this capricious system became less obvious. Rule of law, especially regarding 
property rights, became relatively more important for domestic capital as their invest­
ments grew." He also suggests that this process is partly responsible for the state’s
interest in creating an indigenous bourgeoisie. He writes, "Why did the state take 
such pains to develop the indigenous bourgeoisie? At one level this was because
the officials of the state themselves were becoming increasingly integrated with
the (predominantly Chinese] domestic bourgeoisie as joint venture partners or as
monopoly licence holders dependent upon policies of state regulation and protection.”
(Both quotes are from Robison, Inside Indonesia, p. 2.) There is, I think, a small
matter of timing and causality here which Robison does not appear to consider.
Golkar stands for Golongan Kaiya, the state party under the New Order.
22. Robison, Inside Indonesia, p. 3.
114
With an overview before us, it is now possible to back up and take a critical 
look at Robison’s arguments. I begin where Robison begins— with the first task of 
establishing a case for the rise of an indigenous bourgeoisie.23
A Critique
The "F irst Task" Revisited
In view of the role in and impact on the Indonesian state that Robison ascribes
to the ..strong24 indigenous bourgeoisie, matters of class see and strength are not
unimportant. It is, therefore, disappointing that he must admit to a considerable
amount of difficulty in supplying any "quantitative" (p. 88) estimates of the asli
bourgeoisie’s nature qua capitalist class.25 All we are told is that the indigenous
capitalists are "significant'1 in number and operate on a "substantial* scale (p. 363). 
Because Robison constant^ communicates the features and activities of the asli 
bourgeoisie by referring to a limited number of particular capitalists by name (rather 
than by referring to aggregate or group characteristics as one likely would in discuss­
ing, say, the Australian capitalist class), one cannot escape the powerful impression 
that he is in fact describing a tiny group of people, all of whom probably know each
other (at least as acquaintances). Though I did not count, specific mention is made
of perhaps seventy-five individuals (including the Chinese) who fall into the various
categories of strong capitalists. Allowing eveiy adult relative of these seventy-five
people also to be called a large capitalist (being careful, of course, not to double
and triple count where families overlap), would the size of this "class” balloon to
many more than a few thousand individuals?26 And if not, would it not be more
accurate to label this tiny sliver of Indonesian society not a capitalist class, but a
capitalist "crust"? The main point is that if an extremely small group of actors is
23. The reader may already have noted an important discrepancy in the terminology
Robison employs to describe the class whose rise he traces. It is a troubling matter 
which cannot be satisfactorily addressed here. But briefly, Robison claims in various 
places to have documented the rise of a "national" (or "domestic") capitalist class,
as for instance, in his Inside Indonesia piece where he explains how he challenges
the myth that there is no "national" capitalist class. And yet, it is obvious from  
the socio-political arguments Robison goes on to make that the class to  which he 
wants to draw attention is indigenous. The problem is that the labels "national" 
and "domestic," when referring to capital, always include the Chinese (both citizen 
and alien) in Robison’s usage. The Chinese, of course, are unable to  participate in 
any overt pressures for "restructuring." From Robison’s own direct statements (see, 
for example, p. 366), it is quite evident that in most instances he actually wants
to write "indigenous" when instead he writes "national" or "domestic." I will use 
the terms "asli" and "indigenous" when referring to  the class around which Robison
has structured the arguments in his book.
24. Robison is very clear in arguing that the small and middle asli bourgeoisie are
not (nor have they ever been) of significant socio-political or economic importance.
25. There is also no serious discussion of the geographic distribution of this class.
From Robison’s account, the asli bourgeoisie (again, excluding the small and middle 
elements) does not seem to  be "Indonesian" at all, but "Jakartan.”
26. Recall, for perspective, that one half of one percent of Indonesia’s adult population
would be about 500,000 people.
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involved, general assumptions about the interests and demands of capitalists on 
the state need to be reassessed and adjusted.27
It is apparent that Robison in fact operates with general, unadjusted assumptions 
about the capitalists he analyzes in Indonesia. Consider the following passage:
Another mitigating factor is the vety interest of the capitalist class, 
in Indonesia as elsewhere, to sanctify property and, to  an increasing 
degree, to regularise the process of accumulation within a legal and 
predictable framework. Despite the fact that arbitrary political action 
has been a central feature in the establishment of business groups, 
this is" likely to become less acceptable as the capitalist class entrenches 
itself, (p. 349)
The thrust is that, because the asli bourgeoisie are capitalists, they will seek to 
"regularise11 the Indonesian system. The problem here is that Robison does not consider 
the real possibility that this group is small enough to find it very much in their
interest to pursue the seemingly contradictory path of pushing for guarantees of
private property (as Robison points out that they do) and leaving many other "capri­
cious" state practices in place.28 Certainly capriciousness is no great evil when it 
can generally be counted upon to disadvantage one’s com petitors/9 If this is true, 
there is good reason to challenge Robison’s claims that the emergent asli bourgeoisie
will act essentially as ideal—typical capitalists and seek to challenge the patrimonial
state.30
27. While Marxists stress the ownership and control of the means of production in
defining a capitalist class, it would not be a trivial matter theoretically if a capitalist
"class" consisted of a single individual.
28. In an extremely lucid passage, which, I would argue, does considerable damage
to the claims Robison wants to  make about his asli bourgeoisie becoming the main
force behind the restructuring of the state, Robison points out that "there is little
incentive for major indigenous capitalists to agitate for political power as a class
when the militaiy rule so effectively in their interests. A t the same time there is 
no reason whatever for the major indigenous capitalists to  put any real venom into
campaigns against foreign or Chinese capital while they are guaranteed a stake in
the growth of these groups" (p. 364).
29. On this view, we should expect asli capitalists not to attempt a dismantling of 
the patrimonial state, but instead to work to  have it operate as much as possible 
in their interest. This is not the sort of "regularization" Robison writes of, however.
Part of the problem here for Robison seems to  be a belief that it is in the nature 
of capitalist entrepreneurs to press for la issez-faire  conditions. But surely this is
only the case when the number of entrepreneurs is so great and the market so 
broad as to  make the general interests of the class indistinguishable from the particu­
lar interests of each capitalist. Huge transnational corporations, whose managers
are surely as committed as one can be to la issez-faire  principles, routinely refuse 
to invest in a Third World country until guarantees are given that barriers blocking 
the entry of competitors will be erected behind them.
30. Observers should be watchful, then, for evidence that this domestic bourgeoisie
(but not only this class) is in fact quite content to make full use of the "irrational* 
qualities of the Indonesian state. Asli capitalists should not find such manipulation
an especially daunting task, for the power of the state on these matters appears 
to be highly concentrated. One indication of this is supplied by Robison himself. Asli 
entrepreneurs told him that the power to  launch indigenous Indonesians into business
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In sum, though we learn a tremendous amount about the fits and starts of the 
local capitalists over the past century (but especially since the Second World W ar), 
Robison’s support for his assertion that a significant and substantial asli bourgeoisie 
has formed is somewhat disappointing. Not only is he unconvincing in his claim 
that a group deserving of the label "class" has come into existence,31 but he never 
supplies a compelling reason for us to believe that this new bourgeoisie should 
seek the changes in the structure and operation of the state he describes.
Institutional Instruments Recast
A number of references have already been made to Robison’s dissertation. As
some of the criticisms in this section and the one to follow also draw heavily on
apparent inconsistencies and contradictions between Robison’s dissertation and his 
book, it would be helpful to devote some attention to the question of why the
differences between the two works are important. The discussion will then turn to 
the matter of the treatment of the institutional instruments.
Sudden and radical changes in perspective and emphasis are not bad per se. 
(Fads aside, the study of politics in general could benefit from a thorough-going 
"change of mind.*) As long as scholars are careful to demonstrate why a formerly
held view is less compelling than the new one being advanced, no one should complain. 
This brings us to  the problem of Robson’s change of mind in his book. First, he
does not explain his reasons for adopting a new perspective on a whole host of 
issues associated with state and society in Indonesia. Indeed, he makes virtually 
no mention of the generally excellent arguments in his dissertation and subsequent 
articles.32 Second, Robison’s positions and evidence in support of them in his earlier 
work— especially his doctoral thesis— are considerably more plausible and persuasive 
than those in his book.33 One of my objectives in this and the next section of
this essay is to  point out the salient differences in Robison’s two major works. 
Admittedly, it is somewhat tedious to keep bouncing back and forth between the 
two texts as I do. But there is no other easy way to raise the objections I have.34
on a competitive basis was in the hands of "no more than half a dozen individuals
. . ." (p. 355).
31. It is puzzling that Robison should tell us that an asli capitalist class had formed
in Indonesia by the late 1970s, for in 1977 he argued not only that no such group 
had formed, but that a number of factors intrinsic to  the Indonesian system militated
against any such class forming in the near future. Robison never addresses this
discrepancy.
32. Robison’s pre—1983 work is, it should be noted, widely cited in materials dealing
with Indonesian politics— and in most cases quite favorably. Though there are certain 
weaknesses in Robison’s earlier arguments, no one has, in niy view, offered anything
to challenge his penetrating analyses of "bureaucratic capitalism" and the relationships 
he describes among state, foreign capital, and elite classes within Indonesia.
33. That is to  say, on the basis of my own observations, research, and conversations
with a number of students of Indonesian politics (both Indonesians and Westerners), 
I find the characterization of institutions and political dynamics in the disserta­
tion to be closer representations of reality than that given in The Rise o f Capital.
Except in the cases where I make my disagreements plain, I consider all the arguments 
I cite in this essay from Robison’s doctoral thesis to be superior to those put forth 
in the book.
34. For those readers less interested in the actual passages from Robison’s doctoral
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The most striking thing about Robison’s treatment of the institutional instruments!' 
he highlights in The Rise o f Capital is how unrecognizable they are from the very
same institutions described less than a decade earlier in his dissertation. If Robison
saw these institutions as instruments for anything in 1977, it was for the preservation
and entrenchment of the politico—bureaucratic factions within the New Order which
had appropriated them.35 Robison specifically argues that these bodies, which consti­
tuted an alliance of state officials, Chinese capitalists, and foreign entrepreneurs
(and excluded, almost by design, most asli elements), were not creating a strong
and independent indigenous capitalist class in Indonesia.
Robison’s contrasting treatment of two such institutional bodies, Pertamina
and Bulog,36 37 is representative of the gap separating book and dissertation. In The
Rise o f Capital, these two state corporations are portrayed predominantly as "engines" 
of national industrialization and generators of an indigenous capitalist class. In 
the dissertation, these same state structures are discussed mainly as instruments
constantly plundered by officials for patronage (and political survival) purposes.38
The "spin-offs" from state corporations, which Robison argues in The Rise o f Capital
are so important in catalyzing the growth of asli capital, are described in the disserta­
tion as being of benefit overwhelmingly to foreigners and Chinese (and, of course,
to the arbitrager-officials with whom they worked so closely). The evidence offered
to prove that this is no longer the case is far from persuasive, and not at all consis—
thesis, I have tried to confine them to the footnotes.
35. Not just the particular instruments involved, but the entire process underway,
are described in startlingly different terms in the dissertation. Robison writes, for 
example, that "bureaucratic capitalism functions not as the agent o f the transfor­
mation of the Indonesian economy from an underdeveloped or peripheral capitalism 
to national industrial capitalism but to preserve a partial capitalism in which the 
national component takes the form of merchant capitalism." (Robison, "Capitalism 
and the Bureaucratic State," p. 2). [My emphasis). Though I believe Robison is basically 
correct about the deepening and preserving impact of bureaucratic capitalism with 
specific reference to the role played by politico—bureaucrats, the overall perspec­
tive in his dissertation is overly static insofar as it ignores other sources of pressure
for change— such as those coming from Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and various 
international agencies serving many of their interests.
36. Pertamina is the name of the state—owned oil company, and Bulog (Badan Urusan 
Logistik Nasional), like the "Marketing Boards" in Tropical Africa, is responsible 
for the purchase and price stabilization of various basic commodities, especially rice.
37. Robison refers to Pertamina as a "model for state business relationships" (p.
156), and says it was "used as the spearhead for the creation of industrial capitalist
accumulation" (p. 152). Bulog is mentioned almost exclusively in terms of its role 
as the distributor and regulator of basic commodities (p. 220). It has been a "major 
launching pad" for indigenous corporate capital (p. 229).
38. The very first thing that Robison says about Bulog in his doctoral thesis is that
it is "a lucrative appanage benefice" (p. 243) for the state officials that control it. 
It has survived, despite its often dismal purchasing and regulatory performance,
because of its "value as a source of finance and patronage . . ." (p. 243). Robison 
writes, meanwhile, that Pertamina was used by politico—bureaucrats to  raise funds 
which are then "ploughed into the political survival of military ruling groups of the 
New Order" (p. 239). (All page references in this note are to  Robison, "Capitalism 
and the Bureaucratic State.")
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tent with observations of Indonesian lawyers who draft the various private contracts 
masking the actual ownership patterns of firms by Chinese and foreigners.39
Another issue which is problematic is that of the alleged "deliberate" and long­
standing effort on the part of the state to  create a strong indigenous bourgeoisie.
It is never entirely obvious why the state should want to undertake this potentially 
self-subjecting project with gusto.40 When Robison ascribes this intention to the 
"state," is he in fact referring to  the strategies of a small clique of technocrats
whose power and influence he himself admits to be rather tenuous? This is never
completely clear.41 One very good reason to suspect that there has been more rhetoric 
than substance on this issue is the rather curious fact that the Chinese (and foreign­
ers, for that matter) have consistently outperformed the asli capitalists, in both
absolute and relative terms, in spite of repeated "deliberate" state efforts to protect 
and promote the latter.42
There is no mention whatever in Robison’s dissertation of this powerful "national­
ist" government strategy to  create an asli bourgeoisie. Indeed, Robison supplies
there some fairly compelling arguments to suggest that the very organization and 
operation of the system in Indonesia (the "patrimonial bureaucratic capitalist state") 
militate against any strong commitment to  the entrepreneurial (much less the political) 
aspirations of asli entrepreneurs,43 writing, for instance, that,
The formation of a strong national economy is indeed contrary to  the 
interests of the bureaucrat bourgeoisie who have formed structural
ties to foreign and Chinese bourgeoisie which provide fundamental financial
39. Based on private discussions with Indonesian corporate lawyers in Jakarta and 
the US.
40. Robison’s assertion raises several questions. Is there, for instance, some powerful 
structural imperative operating such that the state would be better off in fiscal 
terms if the asli bourgeoisie were made stronger? Is the alleged effort based on 
some artefact of national pride left over from the independence struggle against
the Dutch? Why would a state, which has long enjoyed considerable autonomy from
domestic social classes, not seek to keep a potentially pushy domestic bourgeoisie
in a "requesting" rather than a "demanding" position?
41. Robison mentions that it was the view of young indigenous entrepreneurs he inter­
viewed that the residents of the palace were not "interested in the creation of a
genuine indigenous capitalist class or even in becoming capitalists themselves . . .”
(p. 355). In his dissertation Robison writes, moreover, that, "Generally it was felt 
that economic planners had no special commitment to  the creation of a strong Asli 
bourgeoisie." Robison, "Capitalism and the Bureaucratic State," p. 213.
42. Robison tries to  explain this curious Chinese staying—power by referring to their
"inbuilt—resilience" and the fact that they run "tight-knit" family firms integrated
into well—developed credit and distribution networks. (See, for instance, p. 272).
Important as these factors may be, they are not nearly as crucial as the one mentioned 
in Robison’s 1978 Indonesia article, where he attributes the Chinese success, even 
after the 1974 legislative changes, primarily to the fact of their intimate ties (struc­
tural and personal) to  politico-bureaucrats. See Robison, "Towards a Class Analyse," 
pp. 22-23.
43. According to  Robison, "The purpose of bureaucrat bourgeoisie in entering business
is not the accumulation and investment of capital but the raising of finance for
political and personal survival." He says, furthermore, that bureaucratic capitalism
supports merchant capitalism against "national, industrial capitalism." (Robison, "Capi­
talism and the Bureaucratic State," p. 14.)
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support for the New Order politico-bureaucrat elites. Through these 
ties they have become |not "capitalists,* as in The Rise o f Capital, 
but] an integral component of the neo-merchant, dependent, capitalist 
economy.
He continues that .as long as the bureaucratic state persists in Indonesia, experiences 
like Benteng "can only be continually repeated in varying form."44 I found no place 
in Robison’s book where he argues explicitly that the bureaucratic state is no more. 
Indeed, according to his Inside Indonesia article, it is precisely the bureaucratic 
state which his strong bourgeoisie is "beginning" to restructure.
In The “Rise o f Capital, Robison tends to raise this question of intentional state 
support of the local bourgeoisie in the same breath he discusses "national" strategies, 
actors, and interests. His disdain for any further Indonesian integration into the
New International Division of Labor (as pushed by the IM F-W orld Bank crowd on 
behalf of transnational capital) leads him into a rather disconcerting acceptance 
and adoption of New Order "nationalist" rhetoric supporting selected domestic interests
often no more beneficial to "Indonesia" (but surely to  the small groups pushing
for them) than the NIDL path he opposes.45 He quotes, for instance, selected "bureau­
crat nationalists" as saying that the IM F-W orld Bank development strategy for Indone­
sia is "sinister" and holds back "the true development potential of Indonesia" (p.
154). As for what "Indonesia’s" "true" development potential is, we do not know, 
for Robison never seriously challenges this term "nationalist."46
44. Robison, "Capitalism and the Bureaucratic State," p. 445. On page 238 of his 
dissertation Robison writes that "we cannot therefore say that bureaucrat capitalism 
is the genesis of a national, industrial Asli bourgeoisie. Instead of the appropriation 
of state capital and resources to establish large national industrial corporations
(except in the ill-fa ted  case of Ibnu Sutowo) we have seen the appropriated facilities 
and resources channeled to foreign an Chinese bourgeoisie." Without explaining
what his reasons are for doing so, Robison presents the opposite view on p. 212 
of his book.
45. On page 154, for instance, President Suharto’s support of the international bor­
rowing spree by Ibnu Sutowo throughout the early 1970s (which bankrupted Pertamina),
is portrayed not as an effort by the president to maximize his access to highly
discretionary funds for patrimonial purposes, but mainly as nationalist—inspired maneu­
vers.
46. On page 148 we are told that the "bureaucrat nationalists” view the penetra­
tion of foreign capital as "an exploitative and destructive exercise for Indonesia," 
while a nationalist strategy would harness these same forces for "long-term  national 
economic goals. . . . "  Is a policy nationalist if it benefits a small sliver of Indonesia’s 
population instead of a small sliver of some other country’s population? Robison
himself seems to point out, incidentally, that most nationalist investments by the
state in the 1970s and 1980s have gone toward the construction of "infrastructure," 
which is what such resources are typically used for when serving the interests of
international capital seeking an improved environment for surplus extraction. A  
matter of considerable importance (which cannot, unfortunately, be addressed fully
in this short essay) concerns Robison’s view of the prime motives of state action.
The state seems to  act primarily in response to  "legitimacy crises" that arise when 
one or another social group (almost always "declining” or "decaying," curiously) publicly 
questions the government’s "nationalist" commitment. Robison does not, I think, 
make a convincing case for the potency of this political lever.
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This brings us, finally, to  the Malari riots of 1974.47 There are several questions 
that Robison’s discussion of the Jakarta uprisings raises, but the most pressing 
one must be why he mentions the events at all (or why he devotes as much attention
to the Malari as he does). It seems that he wants to  weave this outburst into a 
broader fabric of ever—mounting indigenous social pressure aimed at bringing about
policy changes beneficial to  asli capitalist interests. The objective appears to be 
one of arguing that the riots played an integral role in the eventual rise of a strong 
bourgeoisie. But from his own story it is evident that no such role was actually 
played. A brief review of the Robison account should make this plain.
Robison is very clear in maintaining that the elements of what he calls the 
strong a'sli bourgeoisie did not participate in the events of 1974. The core rebels 
were comprised of the weak and "declining" (p. 163) social forces which were, by
the early 1970s, disgruntled with the rotten socio-economic fruits the New Order 
regime (which had taken power with no small amount of middle and upper class
support and expectation) had produced. These included the small and middle indigenous 
bourgeoisie, students, urban intellectuals, and a spattering of disaffected military 
types as allies. Though Robison admits that these forces had virtually no support
in the wider population, and that they were handily crushed by the military govern­
ment, he argues, "nevertheless," that their actions so unsettled the regime that ail
kinds of changes were instituted to placate them.48 Oddly enough, it would appear
that from all the evidence Robison himself presents, the groups which "forced" an 
accommodation from the state hardly benefrtted at a ll from whatever policy changes 
were won.49 More curious still, the very same "nationalist" legislative reforms (to
the extent that they were of substance) do not seem to have been of much significance 
in the processes contributing most significantly to  the successful rise of the people 
Robison calls a strong asli bourgeoisie. The truly crucial factor in the transformation 
of politico-bureaucrat to strong capitalist, as Robison himself points out, was their 
tenacious grip on a strategy of tight integration and alliance with foreign and Chinese 
capital within a framework of joint ventures and various other (largely patrimonial- 
inspired) import—export schemes. Robison writes,
Those indigenous capitalists who have organised politically to defend 
their interests as a class over the past thirty-five years have been 
precisely those declining, Muslim—oriented traders and small-scale manufac­
turers without the social or economic power to  impose their political
will on successive governments. The more successful indigenous capitalists 
preferred to  consolidate themselves through the existing mechanisms
of patronage and joint venture, rather than by organising publicly in
defence of class interests, (p. 324)
47. Robison presents his main arguments about the Malari and its importance in
chapter five, "The State, International Capital and Economic Nationalism: 1965-1975,"
pp. 131-75 .
48. Robison argues on page 119 that "decaying" social forces cannot bring about 
major changes in state policy, incidentally.
49. Not only were students arrested and various media muzzled, but Robison suggests
in several places that the protective laws fought for in 1974, "if indeed they have 
ever been rigorously applied" (p. 315), were of minimal consequence for small and 
middle elements of the asli capitalist class. Two studies Robison mentions in his 
book, one on Australian joint ventures in Indonesia in 1977, and the other on Japanese 
joint ventures in 1980, found oveiwhelmingly that the Indonesian partners were
still Chinese. The 1977 study said that indigenous partners (when used) are fronts
to give the "impression that Indonesians share in foreign investment" (p. 193).
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In short, the lone group to benefit from the Malari riots was that element of asli 
capital which did not participate, but instead allied with the very groups (and prac­
tices) against which the uprisings were directed in the first place. If this is an 
accurate representation of the events, Robison has devoted a great deal of attention 
to a dramatic but relatively inconsequential sideshow.50
The Second Task Revisited
Robison’s first task was to argue that a strong indigenous capitalist class had 
formed in Indonesia. Related to this was the project of explaining how this occurred. 
His second task, though he did not call it this, was to explore the socio-political 
impact of this new and potentially significant class on the structure and operation 
of the essentially patrimonial Indonesian state. This section will assess Robison’s 
arguments about the direction of change currently underway as a direct result of 
the rise of a significant and substantial asli capitalist class.
The old pattern of asli involvement in capitalism in Indonesia, described very
nicely in Robison’s pre-1983 writings, was characterized by the image of the "briefcase" 
entrepreneur. No significant capitalist class could arise out of this pattern because 
the indigenous partners never became engaged in the processes or logic of capitalist 
accumulation. Basically, they collected rents on the "access" they provided for "real" 
capitalists. Robison supplies the following excellent description in his thesis of the 
social and political implications of this pattern:
As far as the emergence of an Asli rational [sic] and industrial bourgeoisie 
is concerned, the evidence provided in the case studies of the private
business groups of bureaucrat bourgeoisie and their clients would suggest 
that there is no A sli challenge either to foreign or Chinese capita! or
the politico-bureaucratic state. On the contrary, these business groups 
represent an integration rather than a confrontation with these forces 
and with the dependent and partial nature of Indonesian capitalism. . . .
It must be expected that this situation will continue. . . .51
Robison suddenly asserts in his book that all of this changed when the politico-
bureaucrats, who were building considerable personal fortunes, began to sink their 
resources into enterprises as minority shareholders in joint ventures with the same
50. Once again, if we glance back at the description of the same events in Robison’s
dissertation, we get an entirely different, and, I would argue, better, sense of their 
intent and impact. He writes that "seemingly" there was a "nationalist drift" in 
policy. But "none of the changes actually undertaken have (s/c) fundamentally threat­
ened the socio-economic structure of a dependent, neo—mercantilist economy" (p. 
397). Elsewhere in the dissertation Robison says that "By 1975, after the settling
of the confusion which followed the January riots of 1974, there seemed little evidence 
to suggest that either the neo-patrimonial bureaucratic state and elite or neo-merchant 
capitalism had been seriously disturbed" (p. 352). (See Robison, "Capitalism and the 
Bureaucratic State.") It seems unlikely that the additional years since 1977 have
revealed that much more about the role the Malari played in the politics of the 
1970s. In any event, the relevant impact must have been immediate, for as Robison 
points out in The Rise o f Capital, the asli bourgeoisie had been boosted into existence 
by the late 1970s— when Robison was writing his dissertation.
51. Robison, "Capitalism and the Bureaucratic State," p. 345 (my emphasis). Robison 
goes so far as to argue, somewhat incorrectly, that Indonesia " . . .  is not in the 
process of transformation to  a society of bourgeoisie and wage labourers." (Ibid., 
p. 374.)
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Chinese and foreign capitalists they formerly served only as arbitragers.52 A tension 
arose within each budding asli capitalist as the dual roles of politico-bureaucrat 
and capitalist clashed with each other. It is predominantly at this personal, particular 
level that transforming pressures are building within the Indonesian state, according 
to Robison.
One place to start in assessing this scenario might, once again, be with Robison’s 
dissertation. There he argues, first of all, that there were a number of personal factors 
inhibiting the veiy processes he now claims were already underway in the 1970s.53 
Few incentives existed for politico—bureaucrats, who needed fairly rapid turnovers 
on their, briefcase—entrepreneurial activities to maintain their patron-client networks, 
to sink their resources into long-term  industrial production.54 Second, to the extent 
that growing personal fortunes were being invested, the capital was not going into
"productive" ventures at all, but instead into land (including rice fields in the rural 
areas), real estate, hotels, and even gold. It was also being put in foreign and domestic
bank accounts (and no doubt being drawn upon by Chinese and foreign entrepreneurs
for productive endeavors) to collect interest. These investments made perfect sense
in an environment where patrons could fall and fortunes invested in ventures dependent 
in any way on "access” could be wiped out.55 My main criticism here is that in
52. There are two passages in The Rise o f Capital which should be highlighted here.
The first one (see p. 223) is the point at which Robison wants to demonstrate that
a transforming process is underway whereby ever-stronger capitalists in Indonesia
are gradually taking over the functions of the state corporate sector. That is, they
are benefitting from the "spin-offs." It is startling that the example Robison offers
as evidence of this process is that of Liem Sioe Liong’s take over of the s ta te -
run cement industry. O f course, Liem is Chinese. The second passage (p. 311) is,
in some ways, even more troubling, for Robison not only supplies additional evidence
of the fact that it is probably the rise of the Chinese capitalist class he should
have focused on, but he tries to  argue that the Chinese will be able to bring their 
weight down on the side of "regularization" in the conflict with the patrimonial
system. Such a suggestion is unconvincing, particularly in light of Robison’s own 
arguments elsewhere in the book to the effect that tire Chinese (for ethnic reasons) 
can play no such role. Robison was closer to the truth the first time when he wrote
in his dissertation that "a bourgeoisie with national interests capable of challenging 
foreign economic power is emerging in Indonesia. It is, however, a Chinese Indonesian 
bourgeoisie." Robison, "Capitalism and the Bureaucratic State," p. 14. [My emphasis].
53. Robison writes, with reference to the politico—bureaucrats, that "For the most 
part, their moves into business have not resulted in the emergence of an Asli national 
bourgeoisie. The patterns of the Liberal Democratic period [1950 to 1957) are repeated
instead. . . . these bourgeoisie do not confront either politico—bureaucratic power
or foreign and Chinese bourgeoisie but, instead, their groups are an integral and
dependent component o f bodi." Robison, "Capitalism and the Bureaucratic State,"
p. 292. [My emphasis].
54. Joint ventures were not being used to accumulate capital, Robison argued in
his dissertation, but "Instead, the joint venture, where it involves the politico—bureau­
cratic elite, has become simply the institutionalized means of exchanging concessions
for finance." Ibid., p. 284.
55. Robison has much to  say in his dissertation about what the politico—bureaucrats
were (and were not) doing with the surplus they extracted from the Indonesian 
system. For instance, he writes that "much of the wealth flowing to Indonesians
is not being accumulated and invested but consumed" (p. 146). He continues, "It 
would appear instead that the privately owned finance of officials is directed primarily
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The Rise o f Capital virtually no mention is made of these very real impediments
and, more importantly, how they were overcome.56 When a pattern of capital ownership 
and investment changes so dramatically, it is important that the reasons for this 
change be explored carefully. At the very least, Robison should have addressed his 
own arguments about the obstacles preventing politico—bureaucrats from becoming 
actual capitalist entrepreneurs.
Let us grant the case, however. Let us accept that the impediments were over­
come and a strong (if quite tiny) asli bourgeoisie has been created (even deliberately). 
It is still important to  take a critical look at what Robison sees as the socio-political
implications of these changes. The matter I would like to  delve into here is that
of the “tension" Robison says has arisen within each new capitalist, and what follows 
from it.
Robison’s basic position on the impact of the strong asli bourgeoisie is summarized 
nicely in the following passage:
Their significance as a component of the capitalist class is not the 
extent of their ownership of capital but their potential to act politically 
and publicly on behalf of capital against the immediate interests of 
the state and its officials who may see revenue collection, long-term  
planning and control of the terminals of state economic power (the 
institutional instruments] as more important than short-term  problems 
of accumulation, (pp. 364—65)
Robison points out that the asli capitalists now share with foreign and Chinese 
capitalists an interest in such matters as interest rates, the price of labor, government 
fiscal policy, access to  markets, and general conditions for corporate competition. 
But only they, unlike their otherwise more powerful non-asli competitors, are able 
to press for changes in overtly political ways.
The major objection to be raised here concerns what I think might be a basic 
flaw in Robison’s portrayal of the situation, the logic involved, and the options 
available to the nascent asli capitalists. Simply put, the “tension” Robison describes—  
pitting the practices of patrimony against the demands of industrial capitalism— is
towards the purchase of urban property, particularly office blocks, hotels, shopping 
centres and luxury housing estates* (p. 344). The veiy logic of bureaucratic capitalist 
appropriation for finance, writes Robison, with its quick turnover, low-cost, lo w - 
overhead, and low—complication character, is "anti-industrialization" (p. 238). The
political patron has no interest in the "long—term" industrial sector, with its low 
profit rates and constant capital reinvestment requirements (for these get in the
way of consumption and selective distribution, which are the core of the patrimonial 
system). All references here are to Robison, "Capitalism and the Bureaucratic State."
56. In The Rise o f Capital Robison says that asli entrepreneurs are taking ever 
greater shares in joint ventures. Meanwhile, joint ventures, the institutional instru­
ments which give politico—bureaucrats a stake in the capitalist side of the system 
(and, in the process, create capitalists), played no such role according to  Robison’s 
dissertation. In 1977 Robison wrote that there have been "few attempts to establish
large industrial enterprises. Instead, as the companies become bigger, there is an
increased tendency to enter joint ventures as a minor partner (who does not manage
the company or direct its resources for investment]." On the impact of joint ventures, 
Robison’s thesis contends that "What is occurring here is the capitalization o f the 
Chinese bourgeoisie by the Indonesian state." (Robison, "Capitalism and the Bureaucratic 
State," p. 284). (My emphasis]. This image is, of course, utterly unrecognizable once 
it finds its way into the pages of The Rise o f Capital.
124
probably overstated. The image Robison conjures is one of asli capitalists having 
(at some point) to take sides and make a clear choice between their patrimonial
and capitalistic behaviors and interests. I would argue that no such choice is, in 
any general sense, necessary or inevitable. With specific reference to asli capital 
in Indonesia, an even stronger proposition can be made: it would on balance not
be in their interest to make such a sharp choice.
One way to flesh out this proposition would be to explore the conditions under
which it would be very much in the interest of asli capitalists to dismantle the 
patrimonial state. There would be at least two circumstances under which the reasons 
for taking such action would be compelling. The first would be if asli capitalists
cum politico—bureaucrats derived all or even most of their incomes from capitalist 
profits (from their typically minor share in joint ventures). Put another way, they
would be considerably more eager to scrap the patrimonial system if their material
sustenance from it were almost nil. Robison nowhere makes this case.57 A second
compelling reason to do away with the patrimonial state (again, strictly from the 
perspective of a rather small asli bourgeoisie increasingly involved in capitalist 
ventures) would be if the state and its "capricious" practices were utterly non—adjust­
able. That is, the choice would be all or nothing. It is on this second matter that 
Robison’s lines are drawn much too brightly.
It is not at all obvious that members of the asli capitalist class (individually 
or collectively) should in fact desire to dismantle the patrimonial state in its entirety.
This brings us full circle on the matter of the size and composition of the capitalist 
"class" itself. Blanket motivations cannot be ascribed to individuals and groups just
because they are involved in capitalist modes of accumulation. I f  the strong indigenous 
capitalist "class" of "Indonesia" is indeed a very tiny, close-knit slice of the population 
whose singular advantage vis—a—vis Chinese and foreign competitors is the capricious— 
ness of the state system (which only the asli elements can hope to command politi­
cally); i f  a significant share of this same group’s wealth and power still derives
from embracing and advancing their politico—bureaucratic role (by charging rent 
for access); and, perhaps most importantly, i f  the patrimonial state itself can be
modestly reformed to  accommodate certain key needs of large-scale property owners 
(mainly guarantees that property cannot be confiscated arbitrarily), but otherwise
left essentially intact so it can serve many of the tremendous advantage-granting 
functions it has served in the past for the very crust of actors at its helm, then 
Robison’s suggestion that these new asli forces will (even gradually) challenge the 
patrimonial character of the Indonesian state (and "restructure" it fundamentally) 
is probably mistaken.
Robison tends to view the capriciousness of the Indonesian state only in terms
of the fetters it imposes on the activities of industrial entrepreneurs. But caprice 
(meaning the absence of strong rule of law) surely has it indispensible side. For it 
is what enables a police state to carry out its social control function on behalf of 
the privileged classes in a society where distribution is severely skewed.58 The
57. In his dissertation he notes, in support of the point I am tiying to make here,
that "Whilst the bureaucrat state remains patrimonial and factions and individuals
within it remain dependent upon appropriating and selling political power for political 
and personal survival, self interest will continue undermine (sic) national policy. A  
high price for political concessions will continue to  be more appealing to  the politico- 
bureaucratic elite than administering a protracted programme aimed at creating a 
national economy." Robison, "Capitalism and the Bureaucratic State," p. 346.
58. And getting worse, if Bulkin’s data are correct. See Farchan Bulkin, "State 
and Society: Indonesian Politics Under the New Order (1966—1978)" (Ph.D. dissertation,
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positive and useful side of caprice for asli elites (capitalist or otherwise), then, is 
that it prevents huge disenfranchised chunks of society from advancing their interests 
effectively. If rule of law prevailed in general, it would be "legal" to form real
opposition movements which would surely swell rapidly in Indonesia into a force
at least as threatening as the Communist Party was in the early and m id-1960s. It 
would seem, therefore, that caprice is in a basic sense a prerequisite for maintaining 
the status quo, and that any "restructuring" of the Indonesian state by asli capitalists
(if the whole game is not to be threatened) must leave much of the system intact.
It is not clear whether Robison agrees with this claim, or, if he does, whether he
recognizes its implications for the real limits to what he terms "regularization" of
the system.59 The thrust of my objection to Robison’s version of what the asli
capitalists are likely to do (or are already doing) to the Indonesian state is that,
if they are motivated to do anything, it is to maintain the current system (with 
relatively modest reforms), not sweep it away.
Structural Factors
Probably the single greatest weakness of Robison’s book is its narrow focus 
on the asli bourgeoisie as the primary locus of dynamism and source of pressure 
for change in the political economy of Indonesia. This final section will argue that 
structural imperatives of the Indonesian state (especially revenue—related ones) are 
and have been far more crucial in shaping not only the content of key state policies,
but also the evolving form of the state’s structure and operation. The central issue
here, of course, is the theory of the state one wants to advance. Despite the size 
and strength of the Indonesian militaiy-bureaucratic state (and the relative weakness
of domestic social classes, even after the rise of a "strong" asli bourgeoisie), Robison
insists on a society—centered60 approach to the analysis of the entire state system
University of Washington at Seattle, 1983). Robison’s tendency to view everything, 
including the state, from the perspective of capital leads to  a narrowness of motivation
for most policies and actions on the part of the state. When the state acts, it must 
be in service of the politically and economically dominant classes (except when 
these classes are "weak," in which case there is a power "vacuum" and the state 
acts "relatively autonomously"— which, for Robison, seems to mean with no clear
social logic at all). The state itself, as a social structure, needs to  be taken much
more seriously. Benedict Anderson has done some work along these lines in his
"Old State, New Society: Indonesia’s New Order in Comparative Historical Perspec­
tive," Journal o f Asian Studies 42, 3 (1983).
59. He does say in several places that he does not foresee "bourgeois democracy," 
but instead some sort of "authoritarian corporatism." (This view is summarized in 
Robison, Inside Indonesia, p. 3). What is authoritarian corporatism but institutionalized 
exclusion and structured caprice? Again, caprice is not in itself an evil. Only uncon­
trolled or unpredictable caprice. My argument is that it makes sense to expect asli 
capitalists not to dismantle the capricious system (which anyway they cannot live 
without), but to make every effort to make it work as much as possible in their 
own interests (which is to say, against those of their economic and social competitors).
60. For a concise discussion of the differences between s ta te - and society-centered 
approaches, see Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis 
in Current Research," in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Ruesch— 
meyer, and Theda Skocpol (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
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(which implies, of course, a theoretical view of state—society relations).61 It is his 
society-centered view, for instance, which leads him to argue (somewhat unconvinc­
ingly) that the state made a deliberate effort to create a strong asli bourgeoisie. 
This same view informs his arguments about how the Malari riots "forced" changes 
in major areas of Indonesian state policy.
It is interesting that while Robison clings to a society-centered perspective to
explain the shift in state policy in 1974, he must abandon this line of argument
when it comes to accounting for the next major policy shift, which occurred in 
1981/82. Suddenly, Robison is forced to focus his attention on structural factors
having to  do with the fiscal base of the state itself, and the various crises the 
system was facing. If Robison admits that the collapse of oil prices was the prime 
factor in forcing a reassessment of Indonesian state policy in the early 1980s,62 
why does he not focus on the dramatic price hikes of 1973/74 as the prime factor
in the policy changes of those years? It is strange indeed that Robison emphasizes
societal forces to explain key state policy shifts at a point when the strong asli
bourgeoisie has not yet formed (1974), and structural (and even extra-national)
forces at a point when this same bourgeoisie is, if we are to believe the arguments 
in his book, already constituted and flourishing (1981/82).
There are many indications in The Rise o f Capital that Robison is aware of 
the importance of structural, state—centered forces in the political phenomena he 
describes. The disappointing fact is, however, that these important references, espe­
cially to revenue—related factors, are never at the center of his analysis, but instead
always lurking in the shadow cast by the true star of the show: the indigenous 
social classes. There are three important points at which Robison oscillates between
s ta te - and society—centered perspectives in a way which indicates, perhaps, his 
own creeping suspicion that his stubborn focus on the asli bourgeois classes may
be essentially beside the point. The first is in chapter five, which raises a number
of "theoretical considerations." About midway through this chapter Robison is already
making references to  the importance of the oil price hikes of the early 1970s, as 
when he writes that they greatly "strengthened the hand of national capital" in 
its ongoing struggle against foreign concerns, just as the collapse of the oil price 
regime in the early 1980s "has weakened it." The important thing to notice here
is that the tremendous shift in the composition of the revenue base of the state
is discussed as a matter which strengthens the hand of national capitalists. O f course 
it did no such thing. It strengthened the hand of the state itself insofar as the
hand of foreign capital, which had until that point been the main supplier of fiscal
resources to the Indonesian state, had been weakened. Asli capitalists, who had
(and have) no significant control over the flows of oil revenues to the state through
Pertamina, were (and are) happy bystanders in these major structural—fiscal gyrations.
Toward the end of the same chapter, when Robison is foreshadowing his discussion 
of the Malari, we are treated to another little structural delicacy. Departing radically 
from his focus of the previous several pages on the various conflicts between the 
national and international elements of capitalist classes operating in Indonesia, Robison
admits that,
61. He writes in his chapter on "theoretical considerations" that "the New Order
can only be understood and explained within its specific historical and social context 
in which class is a crucial factor" (p. 117). The singular flaw of Robison’s book is 
that he treats the rise of an asli capitalist class as the crucial factor.
62. Specifically, in the direction of the "requirements" of foreign capital as urged
by such agencies as the IMF and the World Bank.
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A final, but crucial, factor which gives the state a substantial degree 
of freedom in its choice of policies is its freedom from reliance upon 
domestic sources of revenue. (. . .] Domestic class forces therefore 
possess no leverage against the state deriving from the state’s need 
for revenue, (p. 124)63
Regrettably, Robison drops this extremely important theoretical thread almost as 
suddenly as he picks it up. in the very next paragraph we are back to a discussion 
of how these same groups that lack not only structural levers to grip and pull, 
but social organization reaching (even superficially) into Indonesian society as well, 
"constituted (in 1974) such a potential for social unrest" that the government "judged 
it necessary" to respond to  their demands for protection against capitalist competitors, 
etc. O f course, what was important was not that New Order officials judged it
"necessary" to respond to angry Indonesians, but that they judged it desirable politi­
cally and "possible" in fiscal terms.64 With the windfall of oil profits, which the 
state appropriated directly through its own state corporations, it was possible suddenly 
to withhold state responses (in the form of key policies) to foreign interests and 
placate domestic groups which had been seriously injured qua entrepreneurs prior
to 1974.65 Would Robison be willing to argue that his same declining and decaying 
Malari rebels could have forced a policy change in the absence of a prior shift in 
the revenue base of the state itself? And if he would not, why does he not place 
these prior and far more significant structural factors at the center of his analysis, 
and put the more contingent whinings of the asli bourgeoisie in the shadows?
The third and final point in the book where Robison centers the discussion
squarely on structural matters is his last and best chapter. This chapter is, save 
for the last few paragraphs of the book (when the focus shifts back to the role 
of the asli bourgeoisie), devoted to a consideration of the impact of the collapse
of oil prices on the Indonesian state, its structure, its policies, and the ways in 
which it must adjust (regularize?) to forestall a general fiscal collapse. It is the
63. This passage more than any other confirms my suspicion that Robison needs to 
rethink his theory of the state, and of the forces (structural, political, economic, 
personal, and so on) to which the state responds in the formulation of policy, if 
the state does not rely on domestic sources for revenue, on what sources does it 
rely? And how much freedom does the state have from these sources? On the tax 
base of the Indonesian state, and the very minor share of it contributed by indigenous 
entrepreneurs and their attendant activities, see J.S. Uppal’s Taxation in Indonesia 
(Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1986).
64. The factor making it "possible" was a reduced reliance on foreign suppliers of 
revenue, who, as it turned out, found what policy changes did come about after
1974 rather distasteful. The distaste was reflected in the a declining rate of foreign 
investment.
65. Robison’s rather strange treatment of the collapse in 1975 of Pertamina (which 
he says dealt a "body—blow" to the cause of economic nationalism), is relevant here. 
Ibnu Sutowo used Pertamina, Robison argues, to bankroll the sorts of nationalist 
industrial projects and concerns neglected by IMF and World Bank industrialization 
strategies. One would expect that when Pertamina collapsed and control over this 
"state within a state" was turned over to the technocrats in the National Planning 
offices (who sided in their views with the IMF—World Bank people), state policy 
could not possibly tilt in the "nationalist" direction (especially with the Malari rebels 
stifled). But by some unexplained miracle, the major economic policies between
1975 and 1982 were dominated by "the very sorts of policies urged by the bureaucrat 
nationalists in the period before Pertamina’s collapse" (p. IK ) .  Why?
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only tw enty-five pages in the entire book which allow Robison to make the following 
very important argument, articulated succinctly in his Inside Indonesia article, about 
powerful pressures forcing the Indonesian state to reform itself to "survive".
When the oil prices collapsed the contradictions (between patrimonial 
and rule—of—law practices] grew. Not only could the state no longer 
provide the investment in infrastructure and projects which generated 
high growth rate, (s/c) but patrons had few resources to allocate. On 
top of this, fiscal pressures forced the state to introduce new domestic 
taxes while looming balance of payments problems forced it to move 
away from Import Substitution Industries (ISI) where the capital stock 
of the domestic bourgeoisie was located towards export—oriented policies 
and greater access to foreign capital.
Robison continues,
In this situation the position of the politico-bureaucrats weakened as 
their continued depredations and expropriations clearly became obstacles 
to Indonesia’s very economic survival.™
if there is any "tension" demanding changes in the system, it is surely this last 
(and decidedly structural) one Robison mentions. In sharp contrast to those places 
where Robison claims various social groups have "forced" changes on the Indonesian 
state, somehow his claims above that these powerful structural factors have "forced" 
reforms ring true and are convincing.6 7
It is the last part of Robison’s book which is the most stimulating and fertile. 
But alas, it is also the only part which lies outside the broader theoretical framework 
he uses. Much more research must be done to  explore the ways in which the Indone­
sian system is connected to and shaped by the international environment. This is 
not to suggest that domestic classes and actors are unimportant. Only that their 
structural and institutional levers for pressuring the state are far weaker than those 
wielded and pulled by others. To  the extent that this is true, Robison has misdirected 
his analytical focus in the search for those factors that have been and will be 
most important in bringing change to  Indonesia.
66. Robison, Inside Indonesia, pp. 2—3. (My emphasis].
67. This is not the only place Robison steps out of his society—centered mode and
supplies brief insights which almost undermine everything else he tries to say. T h ree -
fourths of the way through the book, after devoting whole chapters to his argument 
about the rise and impact of the asli bourgeoisie, Robison suddenly writes, with
reference to  the reforms of Pertamina and Bulog (whose political appropriation
and plundering were threatening the very fiscal viability of the state), that the
insolvency of these two state enterprises "was bringing pressures for regularisation
not previously achieved by generations o f critics and reformers" (p. 246). (My emphasis].
